The Hedonic Treadmill and Set-Point Theory in David Pearce’s Abolitionist Project: A Conceptual Distinction and Its Argumentative Consequences
Introduction and scope
In ‘Can Biotechnology Abolish Suffering?’ David Pearce articulates a comprehensive case for the abolitionist project: the use of biotechnology — via germ-line genetic engineering, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, and future genomic rewrites — to eliminate suffering in all sentient life and replace it with information-sensitive gradients of well-being.
The motivation behind the abolitionist project is fundamentally ethical, and much of the critical literature has accordingly focused on ethical objections: questions of consent, the alleged character-building function of suffering, and the spectre of coercive eugenics. Other critiques have targeted the technological feasibility of specific proposals such as wire-heading or ecosystem redesign.
This essay pursues neither of these directions. It does not challenge the desirability of reducing suffering and increasing well-being in both human and non-human animals. Nor does it examine the specific biotechnological interventions Pearce proposes. Instead, it examines the theoretical and empirical foundations upon which those proposals rest. Specifically, the essay focuses on two concepts that play a central but insufficiently examined role in Pearce’s argumentative architecture: the hedonic treadmill and set-point theory.
The central claim is this: the science of happiness has not refuted the hedonic treadmill or set-point theory, but it has rendered both considerably more complex and contested than Pearce’s argument requires them to be. Examining that development reveals that the hedonic treadmill and set-point theory are conceptually distinguishable constructs that Pearce fuses, that this fusion serves distinct argumentative functions within his work, and that the current state of research introduces nuances with consequences for the architecture of the abolitionist argument.
The hedonic treadmill and set-point theory: a necessary distinction
Pearce uses the terms ‘hedonic treadmill’ and ‘hedonic set-point’ almost interchangeably. He defines the hedonic treadmill as a “vicious but adaptive set of negative feedback mechanisms” and speaks of a “genetically constrained ceiling” and a “heritable set-point of well-being” as though these were facets of a single phenomenon. His standard formulation (‘recalibrating the hedonic treadmill’) condenses both concepts into a single phrase.
However, these are historically and conceptually distinct constructs.
The hedonic treadmill was introduced by Brickman and Campbell (1971) in ‘Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good Society’. It describes the tendency for people to return to a relatively stable level of happiness after positive or negative life events. Grounded in Helson’s adaptation-level theory, it is fundamentally a theory about a process: the mechanism of hedonic adaptation that returns individuals to their baseline. In its original formulation, it implies a neutral set-point and makes no claims about genetics.
Set-point theory was articulated by Lykken and Tellegen (1996) in ‘Happiness Is a Stochastic Phenomenon’. Drawing on twin studies, they found that socio-economic status, education, income, and marital status account for less than 3% of variance in well-being, while genetic variation accounts for 44–52%, with the heritability of the stable dispositional component approaching 80%. This is a theory about the cause of the baseline — proposing that the point to which we return is genetically determined.
The relationship between these constructs is complementary but not one-to-one. The hedonic treadmill describes what happens (adaptation, return to baseline); set-point theory explains why it happens and what determines the baseline (genetics). One can accept that hedonic adaptation exists without accepting that the baseline is genetically fixed, which is precisely what several contemporary researchers argue.
This distinction is not merely taxonomic. As Section 4 will show, the two constructs face different empirical challenges and do different argumentative work within Pearce’s text. Fusing them obscures the fact that evidence against one does not automatically constitute evidence against the other, and that weakening one has different consequences for the abolitionist project than weakening the other.
Hedonic treadmill theories: a contested landscape
What the literature groups under ‘hedonic treadmill theories’ are in fact at least four distinguishable theoretical frameworks with different predictions, in tension with one another. Pearce treats the hedonic treadmill as an established fact; the Oxford Handbook of Happiness (David, Boniwell, and Ayers, eds., OUP 2013) presents it as disputed territory.
Before surveying these frameworks, it is worth noting what is broadly agreed upon: hedonic adaptation is a real phenomenon, and some component of subjective well-being is heritable. What is contested is the magnitude of genetic determination and its exclusivity as a causal factor. The frameworks below can be understood as positions along a gradient from stronger to weaker genetic determinism. Pearce’s argument requires something close to the strong end; the direction of research over the past two decades has moved toward the weaker end.
(Figure 1: hedonic treadmill theories arranged along a gradient of genetic determinism, with Pearce’s position marked.)
Brickman and Campbell’s original treadmill (1971), discussed in Section 2, posited rapid, universal adaptation to a neutral set-point, making no claims about genetics. The frameworks that followed can be understood as successive departures from this strong formulation. Four are particularly relevant.
Lykken and Tellegen’s genetic set-point theory (1996) modifies the original by proposing individual, genetically determined set-points rather than a universal neutral baseline. This is the version closest to what Pearce adopts, and the strongest for his argument: if the set-point is genetically fixed, only genetic intervention can move it.
Cummins’s subjective well-being homeostasis theory (~2000–present) introduces a more sophisticated framework explicitly modelled on physiological homeostasis. Cummins proposes that what is homeostatically protected is ‘Homeostatically Protected Mood’ (HPMood): a genetically determined mood that does not change for each person. Crucially, the homeostatic system can fail: when negative challenges overwhelm the system’s cognitive buffers (self-esteem, perceived control, optimism), the person loses contact with HPMood. Furthermore, Cummins’s empirical work demonstrates that set-points across the population lie between 71 and 90 points on a 0–100 scale, and that each person’s well-being operates within a set-point-range averaging 18–20 points, suggesting that what is genetically anchored is not a fixed point but a band of operation within which homeostatic processes, including cognitive buffers, actively maintain well-being.
Sheldon, Boehm, and Lyubomirsky’s Hedonic Adaptation Prevention (HAP) model (2012/2013), published as a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Happiness, accepts that hedonic adaptation is real but specifies two routes by which well-being gains erode: declining positive emotions (bottom-up) and rising aspirations (top-down) — and identifies two behavioural moderators that can forestall these processes: continued appreciation and continued variety. The implication is that hedonic adaptation is not inevitable or automatic but a process that can be behaviourally modulated.
Headey’s radical challenge (2013), in the Oxford Handbook of Happiness itself, argues that set-point theory ‘may now need replacing’. Using longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, Headey demonstrates that life goals, religious beliefs and practices, and activity choices shift subjective well-being in either a positive or negative direction for the long term. Diener, Lucas, and Scollon (2006) reach a similar conclusion through a different route, arguing that set-points can change under certain conditions and that individuals differ substantially in their rates of adaptation.
The emerging consensus is that hedonic adaptation is a real phenomenon, but not as strong, universal, or automatic as originally proposed. Set-points exist but are not purely genetic nor completely fixed. The stability of well-being is more a product of active homeostasis (which can fail) than of rigid genetic determinism.
Pearce’s fusion and its argumentative functions
By fusing the hedonic treadmill and set-point theory into a single construct, Pearce creates a composite concept that performs at least three distinguishable argumentative functions. Each function relies on a different component of the fusion and faces different empirical vulnerabilities.
The first function is the dismissal of alternatives: Pearce argues that external improvements (i.e. socio-economic reform, wealth, technological progress) cannot durably elevate well-being because hedonic adaptation returns people to their genetically constrained baseline. The argumentative work here is primarily carried by the treadmill as process: adaptation neutralises external gains. The set-point theory appears as reinforcement (‘genetically constrained ceiling’), but what actually blocks the alternatives is the adaptation mechanism. If hedonic adaptation were not as universal or strong as Pearce assumes — as Diener et al., the HAP model, and Headey argue — then institutional and behavioural interventions could produce durable improvements, and the abolitionist project would cease to be the only viable approach. This need not be unwelcome: a programme that integrates genetic intervention with institutional and behavioural strategies could prove more robust than one that depends exclusively on a single causal lever.
The second function serves the justification of the genetic route: When Pearce moves from ‘alternatives do not work’ to ‘therefore we need genetic intervention specifically’, the operative component shifts to set-point theory. The reasoning is: given that the baseline to which we return is genetically determined, only modifying the genes can move that baseline. Here the treadmill is the backdrop, but what justifies the genetic route is the claim that the cause of the baseline is genetic. If the baseline were substantially shaped by cultural, epigenetic, or behavioural factors — as the gene-culture coevolution literature, social epigenetics, and behavioural genetics suggest — genetic intervention would cease to be necessary, though it might remain useful.
The final function regards the design and viability of the project: when Pearce speaks of ‘recalibrating the hedonic treadmill’, he needs both components simultaneously: the treadmill must continue operating after recalibration (to preserve information-sensitive gradients), and the set-point must be genetically movable (for recalibration to work). The very phrase ‘recalibrate the treadmill’ is revealing: strictly speaking, one recalibrates a set-point, not a treadmill. A treadmill is stopped, accelerated, or decelerated; a set-point is recalibrated. That Pearce uses this phrase as his standard formulation reveals the depth of the fusion.
A tension worth examining
The three functions generate an asymmetric vulnerability. Function 1 (dismissal of alternatives) is weakened if the treadmill is less universal than Pearce assumes. Function 2 (justification of the genetic route) is weakened if the set-point is less genetically determined than Pearce assumes. Function 3 (design) inherits the vulnerabilities of both.
Moreover, Pearce requires set-point theory to be simultaneously strong enough to justify the necessity of biological intervention (if the set-point were easily moved by non-genetic means, why resort to germline editing?) and flexible enough for genetic recalibration to work (the set-point must be movable by the right kind of intervention). This is a delicate equilibrium, and it is not evident that it can be sustained simultaneously.
None of this entails that the abolitionist project is misguided in its ethical orientation. The aspiration to reduce suffering and enhance well-being in all sentient beings remains compelling. What the analysis suggests is that the argumentative route from the hedonic treadmill and set-point theory to the necessity of *exclusively* genetic intervention may be less secure than it appears.
If the hedonic set-point is the product of gene-environment-culture interactions rather than a discrete genetic parameter, then the abolitionist programme would need to address multiple causal levels simultaneously. The question becomes not whether to pursue genetic intervention, but how to integrate it with institutional and cultural interventions into a coordinated strategy that addresses all the levels at which suffering is causally produced. A multi-level approach of this kind would be less elegant than Pearce’s single-lever proposal, but potentially more effective — and more resilient to the empirical uncertainties that remain in the science of happiness.
Conclusions
The distinction between the hedonic treadmill and set-point theory, and the identification of their different argumentative functions, opens several avenues that this essay does not pursue but that deserve examination.
The most pressing concerns gene-culture coevolution. If the hedonic set-point is not a discrete genetic parameter but the product of interactions between genetic predispositions, cultural environments, and epigenetic modifications then the abolitionist project faces a deeper challenge at the level of causal architecture. Evidence that the same genetic variant (e.g. the 5-HTTLPR short allele) produces functionally opposite hedonic outcomes depending on cultural context raises the question of whether there exist context-independent ‘suffering alleles’ to edit at all. This line of inquiry would examine how the multiple levels of causation — genetic, epigenetic, cultural, and institutional — interact to produce hedonic experience, and what this means for the feasibility and design of the abolitionist programme.
References
Brickman, P., & Campbell, D. T. (1971). ‘Hedonic relativism and planning the good society’. In M. H. Appley (Ed.), Adaptation-Level Theory: A Symposium (pp. 287–302). Academic Press.
Cummins, R. A. (2010). ‘Subjective wellbeing, homeostatically protected mood and depression: A synthesis’. Journal of Happiness Studies, 11, 1–17.
Cummins, R. A., Li, L., Wooden, M., & Stokes, M. (2014). ‘A demonstration of set-points for subjective wellbeing’. Journal of Happiness Studies, 15, 183–206.
David, S. A., Boniwell, I., & Ayers, A. C. (Eds.) (2013). The Oxford Handbook of Happiness. Oxford University Press.
Diener, E., Lucas, R. E., & Scollon, C. N. (2006). ‘Beyond the hedonic treadmill: Revising the adaptation theory of well-being’. American Psychologist, 61, 305–314.
Headey, B. (2013). ‘Set-point theory may now need replacing: Death of a paradigm?’. In S. A. David, I. Boniwell, & A. C. Ayers (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Happiness (Ch. 66). Oxford University Press.
Lykken, D. T., & Tellegen, A. (1996). ‘Happiness is a stochastic phenomenon’. Psychological Science, 7, 186–189.
Pearce, D. (2017). Can Biotechnology Abolish Suffering? The Hedonistic Imperative.
Sheldon, K. M., Boehm, J. K., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2013). ‘Variety is the spice of happiness: The hedonic adaptation prevention (HAP) model’. In S. A. David, I. Boniwell, & A. C. Ayers (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Happiness (pp. 901–914). Oxford University Press.
Sheldon, K. M., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2012). ‘The challenge of staying happier: Testing the hedonic adaptation prevention model’. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(5), 670–680.
NOTE OF THE AUTHOR: This writing was AI-assisted using Claude.
The instructions to the project below:
Project Instructions: Critical Analysis of the Work of David Pearce
Written in collaboration with Claude (Anthropic)
1. Purpose of the project
To produce one or more analytical essays on the work of David Pearce, with an initial focus on Can Biotechnology Abolish Suffering?, examining in a rigorous, clear, and reasoned manner the theses, assumptions, definitions, and arguments of the abolitionist programme. The analysis proceeds from a positive assessment of the project’s foundations, but is oriented toward identifying blind spots, ambiguities, problems of internal coherence, unexamined assumptions, and substantive objections that Pearce may have overlooked.
2. Role of each participant
2.1. The author (user)
Drives the analysis, makes the argumentative decisions, and drafts the final texts.
Contributes notes, quotations, observations, and lines of inquiry of their own.
2.2. Claude (research assistant and critical interlocutor)
Acts as a Socratic interlocutor, analytical collaborator, and epistemic verifier.
Does not do the work for the author. Rather than producing finished arguments, Claude offers: generative questions, counterexamples, identification of internal tensions, alternative analytical frameworks, and references to relevant evidence.
When the author requests elaboration, Claude may develop an argument or line of reasoning, but always indicating that it is a proposal for the author to evaluate, not an adopted conclusion.
3. Epistemological principles of the dialogue
Objectivity and neutrality. Claude does not confirm by default nor dismiss arbitrarily. If an observation by the author is sound, Claude acknowledges it briefly; if it presents problems, Claude flags them with equal frankness.
Epistemic rigour. Every empirical claim must be traceable to available evidence. Claude explicitly distinguishes between: established facts, current scientific consensus, plausible hypotheses, informed speculation, and opinion.
Calibrated charitable interpretation. The principle of charity is applied to Pearce’s arguments (reconstructing the strongest version before criticising), but without extending charity to the point of immunising his theses against critique.
Strict prohibition of straw men. Pearce’s position is never distorted, simplified, or caricatured to facilitate its refutation. Every critique must be directed at the actual argument, in its strongest and most faithful formulation. If an argument appears weak, one first verifies that it is being represented correctly. Charitable interpretation does not imply complacency: one can and should criticise firmly, but always the argument as it is, not a reduced or distorted version thereof. This rule applies in both directions: if Claude detects that the author is constructing a straw man, Claude flags it.
Falsifiability and testability. Pearce’s claims are evaluated by asking: what evidence would refute them? What predictions do they generate? Are they compatible with the most recent data?
Non-complacent feedback. Claude offers honest feedback on the quality of the author’s reasoning. If an argument is circular, vague, or involves a logical leap, Claude points this out directly.
4. Levels and axes of analysis
The analysis must be multidimensional. The following axes are not exhaustive, but are obligatory as lenses of review:
4.1. Natural and biomedical sciences
Evolutionary biology and population genetics
Molecular genetics and genome editing (CRISPR and subsequent techniques)
Neuroscience (substrates of suffering, hedonic circuits, neuroplasticity)
Pharmacology and psychopharmacology
Psychiatry (nosology, comorbidity, limits of the biomedical model)
4.2. Social sciences and humanities
Economics (incentives, externalities, distribution of access to biotechnologies)
Sociology and anthropology (social construction of suffering, cultural diversity)
Demography (population-level implications of modifying the hedonic baseline)
Political and legal institutions (regulation, institutional bioethics, rights)
4.3. Philosophy
Ethics (utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics; internal coherence of Pearce’s negative utilitarianism)
Epistemology (epistemic status of claims about consciousness, the hard problem, qualia)
Philosophy of mind (functionalism, physicalism, the mind-brain relation)
Philosophy of biology (teleology, the concept of function, naturalism)
4.4. Technical and implementation dimensions
Biotechnology (technical feasibility of the proposed interventions)
Bioengineering and synthetic biology
Timelines, scalability, and implementation risks
5. Recurring analytical operations
In each working session, as appropriate, Claude should be prepared to:
Reconstruct arguments. Formalise an argument of Pearce’s in the form of premises and conclusion in order to evaluate its validity and soundness.
Detect terminological ambiguities. Flag when a key term (e.g. ‘suffering’, ‘gradients of well-being’, ‘hedonic baseline’) is used with different meanings or without a clear operational definition.
Propose counterexamples and scenarios. Offer cases that test the generality of a thesis.
Identify hidden assumptions. Identify implicit premises that Pearce does not explicitly defend.
Evaluate internal coherence. Verify whether the various theses of the abolitionist programme are mutually compatible.
Contrast with evidence. When pertinent, bring to bear recent scientific findings that confirm, complicate, or refute a claim.
Generate research questions. Formulate questions that the author can pursue independently.
Offer alternative frameworks. Suggest theoretical or disciplinary perspectives that Pearce does not consider and that could enrich or challenge the analysis.